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Psychological models of mental disorders play an important role in the explanation of
psychological deterioration. Researchers from this area usually study several cognitive
and behavioral variables to account for the onset and maintenance of depression. However,
many authors have detected the need to include a “social dimension” in the explanation
of deterioration. In this sense, social support has become a crucial aspect in the study of
mental health, and the psychological literature on this topic has generated an intense
debate about several facets of the positive impact of social networks on psychological
well-being. In this article, the author defends that this increasing centrality of the concept
has been accompanied by a psychological reductionism that is making the role of “social
aspects” to explain psychological well-being more problematic. Implications of this
reductionism are discussed, and an alternative proposal is made to overcome some
theoretical and empirical problems related to social support research.
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Los modelos psicológicos explicativos de los trastornos mentales tienen un papel central
en la explicación del deterioro psicológico. Los investigadores en el área suelen manejar
algunas variables cognitivas y conductuales para dar cuenta de la aparición y persistencia
de la depresión. Sin embargo, numerosos autores han detectado la necesidad de incluir
una “dimensión social” en la explicación de dicho deterioro. En este sentido, el apoyo social
se ha convertido en un aspecto central para el estudio de la salud mental, y la bibliografía
psicológica sobre el tema ha generado un intenso debate en torno a diversos aspectos del
efecto positivo de las redes sociales en el bienestar psicológico. En el presente artículo el
autor defiende que esta creciente centralidad del concepto se ha visto acompañada por
un reduccionismo psicológico que está problematizando el papel de ‘lo social’ en las
explicaciones del bienestar psicológico. Se comentan las implicaciones de este reduccionismo,
al tiempo que se realiza una propuesta alternativa para superar algunos problemas teóricos
y empíricos relacionados con la investigación sobre el apoyo social.
Palabras clave: apoyo social, integración social, salud mental
Collectivize Social Support? Elements for Reconsidering the
Social Dimension in the Study of Social Support
Esteban Sánchez Moreno
Complutense University of Madrid
The Spanish Journal of Psychology Copyright 2004 by The Spanish Journal of Psychology
2004, Vol. 7, No. 2, 124-134 1138-7416
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Esteban Sánchez Moreno, Departamento de Sociología V, Escuela
Universitaria de Trabajo Social. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Campus de Somosaguas. 28223 Madrid  (Spain). E-mail:
esteban.sanchez@cps.ucm.es
Translation: Virginia Navascués Howard.
124
Is it possible to explain mental illness paying attention
exclusively to individual psychological processes? Is it really
necessary to include processes of a marked social nature in
our explanation of psychological deterioration? These two
questions, so easy to answer, may seem like absurd
justifications for an article intended to be scientific. All the
more so, as the notions expounded herein have the lofty goal
of being judged worthy of the attention of the professionals
of social intervention when designing their activity. This
statement, as well as many others below, is polemic. I am
aware of that, and I believe that, in any case, that this polemic
is an important element when establishing links between
different disciplines and competent viewpoints in the study
of social support. On the other hand, the dimensions of an
article preclude a detailed analysis of some aspects. (For a
more extensive debate about various aspects included in this
article see Sánchez Moreno, 1998, 2002a, 2004; Sánchez
Moreno & Barrón, 2003; Barrón & Sánchez Moreno, 2001,
2003; Sánchez Moreno, Garrido, & Álvaro, 2001). Assuming
the aforementioned risks, I beg readers to be patient, in the
hope that when they finish reading the article, they will be
won over to the belief that, in the practical design of the
analyses of mental illness, the easy answers to both questions
conceal a contradiction that is hardly justifiable.
The psychological explanation of mental illness is
insufficient. Hence, the need to introduce social processes,
to use concepts with a clear social recollection to account
for psychological deterioration. Among these processes,
social support has been a crucial variable, which is why I
dedicate an entire article to it. Social support has been the
life boat in which the psychological outlook has tried to
escape from the accusation of reductionism. Are social
processes necessary to explain mental illness? Of course.
Which is the appropriate level to respond to this need? The
group level. Why is the group so important for mental
illness? Because it is the source of social support. 
Despite the protagonism that several authors have lent
to the concept of social support, we shall see that the
adjective, far from being fundamental, has had in its
linguistic acceptance diluted, to wind up reduced to the
status of a descriptor in articles: Its substantive nature has
been lost in the psychological storm. Let us look into this
in more detail. 
Social Support
The history of social support in relation to mental illness
is short but intense. Short, because, far from intellectual
romanticisms, this concept did not play a relevant role until
the mid seventies. Intense, there are such strong
disagreements about it that nowadays, almost 30 years later,
it is still quite difficult to adequately synthesize the main
disputes that have characterized these three decades.
Nevertheless, there are some clearly identifiable basic trends.
One of them, which I will focus on, has been especially
pernicious. I refer to the psychologization of a process that
started out as the great sociological hope in the field of
mental illness.1
The study of social support was integrated into scientific
activity with the publication of the works of Cobb (1976)
and Cassel (1976). These authors defended the existence of
environmental processes of opposite signs regarding an
individual’s mental health. On the one hand, we have the
processes that undermine mental health: Both authors refer
to stress. On the other, we can identify processes that
perform a protective role: social support. This is a buffering
factor of stress, reducing its impact and thus, protecting
people from the negative effect of stress. In this way, social
support is a process that has a positive effect on people
when in the presence, but not in the absence, of stressors.
But what is social support? According to Cobb (1976, p.
300), social support consists of “information belonging to
one or more of the following kinds: 
1. Information that leads people to believe they are cared
for and loved.
2. Information that leads people to believe they are
esteemed and valued. 
3. Information that leads people to believe they belong
to a network of communication and mutual obligations.”
Such information is born within social relations and,
therefore, is an emergent property within the groups that
comprise people’s social networks. In these networks, the
individual will find protection from stressing situations, life
transitions, destabilizing events that one inevitably encounters
throughout one’s life. In this sense, the group becomes a
sort of armor that people use to protect themselves from the
blows to which they are irremediably exposed at some time
during their existence. Cobb and Cassel coincided in their
analysis. Social support is a group property, whose study is
necessarily linked to stress, because its chief role is to protect
people from the impact of stress. This original agreement,
however, was soon at risk from the subsequent work of
researchers of social support. Specifically, one of the most
persistent debates is precisely the conceptual debate. Thus,
in an argument that is still ongoing, the aforementioned
question is constantly repeated: What is social support? The
main theory of this article is that, in that debate, the concept
has slowly but surely been the object of psychologization
that is scarcely justifiable. 
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1 Therefore, the reader should not expect a discussion of certain aspects that are just as relevant. For example, I will not analyze the
models used to explain the activity of social support (hypothesis of direct effects and hypothesis of buffering effects), except when the
line of reasoning requires me to do so. 
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In general, researchers do not agree about the definition
of social support (Cohen, 1988). This discrepancy has
become notably encysted, with various co-existing
viewpoints of the concept of social support in the research.
According to Barrón (1996), there are three relevant aspects
in the definition of social support: 
First, the level of analysis chosen: communitary level,
social networks, close relationships. 
Second, the study outlooks: structural, functional, and
contextual. 
Third, the definition of social support will depend on
whether emphasis is placed on the objective or the subjective
aspects. 
All these aspects are important in the conceptual analysis
of social support. However, in this explanation, I will
emphasize the aspects revealed as the most relevant in the
current bibliography. 
As is well known, there are two main perspectives of
the study of social support, functional and structural. As
mentioned, there is a third viewpoint, the contextual (Vaux,
1988). However, research has developed in the first two. In
addition, these are one of the areas that, according to Cohen
and Syme (1985), need clarifying and are crucial for the
development of research in social support. Therefore, I shall
comment on them in the following paragraphs. 
The structural viewpoint focuses on the existence,
quantity, and properties of a person’s social relations. In the
analysis of social contacts, it focuses on the study of
structural aspects, ignoring in most cases, the functions
performed by those contacts.
From this perspective, it is assumed that maintaining
social relations implies the existence of social support (that
is, transactions with a beneficial effect on well-being).
Research has therefore focused on determining which
network characteristics are more beneficial and effective for
the individual’s well-being (Stoller & Pugliesi, 1991). Hence,
a series of characteristics of the support network are typically
studied from this viewpoint, among them, the following:
size, density, reciprocity, duration, intensity, frequency,
dispersion, and homogeneity (Barrón, 1996). 
The second perspective, the functional perspective,
emphasizes a different aspect of social relations. It attempts
to identify which of the individual’s functions are satisfied by
the relations. The qualitative aspects of support are therefore
underscored. I refer to a transaction (symmetrical or not) of
resources (ranging from money to affection) oriented to the
satisfaction of a need. In this sense, some authors (House &
Kahn, 1985) define social support as the functional contents
of social interactions, distinguishing it explicitly from other
concepts such as social relations or support networks. In other
words, the functions performed by social interactions for the
person who receives support are specific to social support.
Several social support functions have been indicated (see
Wills, 1985; Farrell, Barnes, & Banerjee, 1995). Basically,
they can be grouped into three types. 
1. Emotional support involves having someone to talk
to, someone to whom one can talk about one’s problems,
etc. Normally, it refers to the assistantial functions carried
out by family, friends, work colleagues, neighbors, or any
significant person. It includes expressions of love, affection,
attraction, esteem, etc., that produce a feeling of affective
well-being. 
2. Instrumental support is made up of help that affects
a need involving either some lack of material resources
(money, living quarters, etc.) or solving everyday problems
(caring for children, helping at home, etc.).
4. Informational support consists of useful advice,
information, or guidelines to cope with important life
changes or to give meaning to the world. 
Summing up, this perspective defends the existence of
a series of functions performed for individuals by members
of their support network. Obviously, these functions are born
within the social relations and, therefore, one could expect
a strong connection between the measurements based on
either of these perspectives (structural and functional).
However, reality does not conform to this assumption. In
fact, the debate between these perspectives has ramifications
that go beyond conceptual aspects. But, at present, my
intention is only to show the general framework in which
were developed the main attempts to offer an operative
definition—adequate to the needs of research—of social
support. 
Social Support?
And here is where the psychologization tendency of
social support starts. This tendency is mainly expressed by
authors who endorse the second perspective, the functional
viewpoint. Obviously, it is difficult to turn a definition of
social support, based on the structural characteristics of the
support network, into a psychological construct. The size,
density of the contacts within the network, etc., are
characteristics that are not imputable to individuals, but
instead to their relational context. 
However, the functional perspective has proved to be
especially rich in possibilities of dissent. Such dissent is not
negative in itself, of course. On the contrary, it facilitates
the vigorous development of the concept of social support.
The truly negative aspect for the study of mental health is
the course that this dissent has taken in the conceptualization
of social support and group relations in general. In this
section, some of the proposals that have had most impact
on research in the area will be analyzed; proposals that, as
the reader will observe, are characterized by progressive
individualization of social support. 
I shall start with the contribution of Lin, Dean, and Ensel
(1986). Considering that intimate relations are the most
important aspect of social support, these authors offer a
definition based on the strength of the ties with close groups.
Social resources are the starting point of social support.
Thus, maintaining adequate levels of mental health requires
sharing experiences and exchanges with persons from the
context of a close relationship. These people would be more
capable of understanding the individual’s problems. This
viewpoint reveals the expressive nature of support activities
(according to the authors, necessary to maintain some level
of psychological well-being). These expressive actions
involve the basic content of intimate relationships.
To sum up, access and use of strong ties with similar
persons (principle of homophilia) would comprise the central
nucleus of social support. This definition is based on the
need for strong ties within the framework of intimate
relations (strong-tie support). The main aspect of social
support would thus consist of providing expressive actions
within the framework of intimacy. The authors have used
the operationalization of this concept in a series of studies
(Dean & Ensel, 1982; Dean, Kolody, & Wood, 1990; Lin
& Ensel, 1984, 1989; Lin, Woelfel, & Light, 1985), revealing
how the expressive actions that are typical of intimate
relations are a beneficial influence for psychological well-
being. 
Some of the concepts that emerged during the eighties
increased the individual weight of social support. In this
sense, the concept of “Support Bank” (Antonucci, 1985;
Antonucci & Akiyama, 1987; Antonucci & Jackson, 1990)
is a great step towards psychologization of the study of
social support. It refers to social support as a “bank account,”
with its respective debits and credits. These credits and
debits are influenced by sociodemographic variables and
determined by early experiences. A concept of social support
based on the perception of the subjects involved is thus
established. Similarly, the “balance,” generated within the
exchange framework and influenced by the perception of
equity, becomes part of the personality. Similarly, situations
of (in)congruence between perception and receipt of support
are established. In this case, such (in)congruence is presented
in terms of balance. The most important aspect of this
balance is found in the individual who manages it, because
social support, as defined by the authors, is not very different
from a savings book issued by any bank to an account
holder. One perceives that one receives and gives, one
obtains the relation between credits and debits, and the result
is “one’s social support.” This is not an emergent property
of social relations; it does not appear in the course of
interaction. This is very important. Despite the fact that the
balance of support results from adding credits and debits,
its nature actually emerges prior to group relations and
focuses on the particular relation that one individual has
with the rest of the members of his group, one by one. Social
support, conceived as balance, or in terms of support bank,
can only be defined as the result of adding and subtracting
credits and debits that the actor receives or suffers with
individual A from his group, plus the result of adding and
subtracting credits and debits with respect to individual B,
plus the result of adding and subtracting credits and debits
with respect to individual C… Ultimately, social support
could be conceived as a mathematical function like the
following: 
AS  (I + G)1 + (I + G)2 + … + (I + G)n
To exaggerate the claim, it could be pointed out that
social support is the combination of additions and
subtractions that the individuals carry out when thinking
about their relations with each of the individuals that
comprise their social network. We carry support in our
pockets, whether we are rich or whether we only have a
few cents. 
Although it may seem difficult, other definitions
reinforce the individual nature of social support even more.
According to some authors, social support should be strictly
considered a personality variable. In a series of works,
Sarason and colleagues (Pierce, Sarason, Sarason, Joseph,
& Henderson, 1996; Sarason, 1988; Sarason & Sarason,
1985; Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1992; Sarason, Sarason,
& Shearin, 1986) attempt to determine the nature of
intraindividual social support. Their concept is based on
observing the primacy of the perception of support on
mental health. That is, their elaboration is based on the
consideration of perceived social support (see Sarason,
Pierce, & Sarason, 1990). According to Sarason (1988), it
is important to establish the place that social support
occupies with regard to the individual. On the one hand,
social support could be placed (and act as) over the
individual and, therefore, would be an external variable (or,
at least, psychosocial). On the other hand, social support
could be a function of personal attributes (or, negatively,
a lack of social skills). The authors prefer the second option.
Social support is comprised of an individual immersed in
a series of relationships with different levels of depth. The
feeling of being loved and valued, according to these
authors, is the chief protective component. 
In order to defend the concept of social support as a
developing personality variable, the authors resort to
Bowlby’s (1969, 1986) attachment theory. According to this
author, early experiences, especially the experience of a
secure and unmenaced relation with a paternal figure, are
necessary to develop subsequent satisfactory relations. A
secure and satisfactory relationship promotes the pattern of
exploring the environment. Once these patterns are
established, and for the rest of the individual’s life, a person
is likely to show the same behavioral pattern, leaving loved
ones and going far away and for increasingly longer periods
of time, but always keeping in contact and sooner or later,
returning. The base from which an adult operates will
probably be his original family or any other base that he
has created for himself. Anyone who lacks a base will feel
uprooted and intensely lonely (Bowlby, 1986). Both patterns,
the attachment pattern and the exploration pattern, alternate
in healthy individuals. 
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On the basis of the attachment theory, Sarason et al.
articulate their concept of the sense of support. Knowing
that others love us and are available is what makes up the
essence of social support. This feeling of support is related
to another personality characteristic, the sense of acceptance.
This refers to the belief that others love and care for us,
accept us as we are, including our best and worst parts
(Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1992). The sense of acceptance
is generated in the inferences about the self, related with,
but not necessarily involved in, the sense of support. 
These personality characteristics wind up acting as
independent variables in individuals’ behavior. In recent
reports, the authors (Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1992)
defend what they call a triad hypothesis. This consists of
three contexts—personal, interpersonal, and situational—in
the analysis of the sense of support. However, both the sense
of support and the sense of acceptance are still parts of
personality, although they are considered products of the
individual history of social interactions (especially in the
early patterns of attachment and exploration). According to
these authors’ reasoning, both personality patterns influence
the way people cope with different types of situations. 
This is one more turn of the screw, another twist of the
spiral that, little by little, deprives social support of all its
social characteristics. This does not refer to characteristics of
the social network, nor the functions that develop in social
relationships. Social support is just another characteristic of
the individual’s personality, like cognitive styles or
extroversion, and should be considered similarly. The
implications of this definition of support can lead to awkward
reasoning. For example, consider a person who has just
emigrated from his original country, and who arrives in Spain
knowing practically nobody, except a few persons. Objectively,
one could say that his support network is especially restricted,
if not nonexistent. Consequently, it is almost common sense
to say that the levels of social support that this person might
enjoy would be particularly low. However, if we use the
outline designed by Sarason’s group as our compass, we might
make the paradoxical discovery that the recently arrived
emigrant may benefit from high levels of social support…
despite not having a minimal relational network! In other
words, if we use the definition these authors provide, a person
in a clearly isolated situation could score high in social
support, because this is only a personality trait, an
intraindividual characteristic. Once again, the adjective “social”
seems to be exclusively a linguistic artifice. 
To sum up, we find a scenario that, slowly but surely,
has become a sort of funnel in which social relations have
been irremediably retained by the narrow part and, social
support, flowing down the drain, has been separated from
them. That is, theorization on social support has wrenched
away its nature of being an emergent process in social
relations, until it wound up defining it in exclusively
psychological terms. What is left over is a concept of social
support completely separated from the hope it originally
was. At some point in the research on mental illness,
researchers’ dissatisfaction with the incapacity of individual
and environmental processes to explain psychological
deterioration forced them to look at certain social processes
in order to find the clues they needed so they could offer a
precise outlook of the way to deterioration. Unfortunately,
the promise of resolution that researchers hoped to find in
social support seems to have been broken. To a great extent,
this disappointment has been concealed in the many debates
about social support that have appeared in the specialized
literature. These debates have generated innumerable works,
theoretical and empirical, books, and articles in specialized
journals offering interested researchers a vast amount of
bibliographic material to support their work. However, this
potentially fruitful debate, susceptible of generating important
advances in our understanding of the social and
psychological processes that lead to mental illness, has
become an impenetrable forest where, rather than
discovering, we seem instead determined to conceal the
aforementioned scientific frustration. But the fundamental
paradox consists of the fact that the debate is precisely what
has guided our steps towards desiccated areas of knowledge,
where arguments have no meaning because they no longer
have the same object. I am not referring to irreconcilable
antinomies, but to radically different—but related—levels
of analysis, the very specificity and difference of which
offered the possibility of enhancing our understanding of
psychological deterioration. 
Within this context, it is not surprising to observe the
appearance of proposals that wind up turning around the
argumentative logic, for example, the work of Baumeister
and Leary (1995). According to these psychologists’
hypothesis, the need to belong is a basic need of human
beings, which acts as a fundamental motivational mechanism.
People have the motivation to make and keep at least a
minimum amount of long-lasting, positive, and significant
interpersonal relations. In order to satisfy this need, frequent
and satisfactory interactions with other persons are necessary,
and, in addition, these interactions should be characterized
by temporal stability and should develop within the
framework of affective concern for the well-being of the
individuals involved in the interaction. This kind of
interactions produces a relational setting that promotes the
perception of strong ties of interdependence, an essential
factor for the satisfaction of the need to belong. The authors
propose that this motivational factor is innate in human
beings, a result of the process of evolution, and difficult to
eradicate culturally. According to Baumeister and Leary
(1995), the result of this natural evolutional process would
be a series of internal mechanisms that lead the individual
to form social groups and long-lasting personal relations.
And within this general context—the context of a need that
has emerged over the course of evolution, and has become
a part of the biological equipment of the human species—
is social support.
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On close examination of these authors’ reasoning, the
argumentative twist can be clearly observed. Social support
changes its status in our general explanatory model. We no
longer have to account for its effect on the individual, but
instead, the constitution of the species should explain why
individuals become involved in social relations. If we look
for the company of others, we give and receive affection,
we establish intimate relations, we join social networks…in
short, if we are social beings, it is because our evolution as
a species impels us to do so. Social support is therefore not
a consequence of our constitution as members of a species.
Once we have deprived social support of its social nature,
we return to the Aristotelian argument—we are social beings
by nature—but stripping it of all its elegance. 
Once again, “social” support?
If we agree that when we focus on a concept only to
deprive if of its distinctiveness, what we are really seeking
is, at best, an error (and at worst, an absurdity), then we need
to look for solutions. We can present an inflamed defense
of the aforementioned structural perspective. In this sense,
social support is defined as the structural properties of an
individual’s support network. However, for various reasons,
this solution does not seem satisfactory. First, to adopt this
stance means that social support is reduced to the bare
description of the traits of the groups where the individual’s
life evolves: how many friends and family members a person
has, the frequency with which he sees them, the density of
the support network, and the homogeneity of its components,
etc. Second, and consequence of the above, we would be
assuming that any social relation is a source of support, which
is a particularly risky assumption (Lakey & Heller, 1988).
Not all social relations act as buffers against life events or
negative situations. These relations may even become stressful
(marital discord, for example). In a study, Haines and Hubert
(1992) found that the increase in the size of the network was
harmful for the women in their sample. In other words, the
women with larger networks revealed higher levels of stress.
This study shows that the multiplicity of ties may involve
the need to spend more time, energy, and resources to
preserve a series of complex relations. Ultimately, the
relations became problematic, and the women’s overfull
agendas—the object of Haines and Hubert’s study—was a
source of stress. Then again, if we ignore the content of
social relations, we run the risk of grouping notably different
realities under the same concept. Thus, according to the
structural perspective, a married person’s family support
network is larger than that of a divorced person. One might
conclude that marriage is an indicator of high levels of social
support. But what about conflictive marriages? In this case,
interaction is not a source of support, but quite the contrary,
a source of stress. 
Summing up, measurements based on a structural
perspective tend to use indicators that do not guarantee the
existence of support-generating relations. In any case, the
analysis of social networks and the structural context of social
support is a necessary task, which has made important
discoveries for understanding the influence of social relations
on people’s well-being (see Barrón, 1996). But it is not a
solution to the dilemma I have mentioned in this article
because social support is not a characteristic of the individual,
nor is it the same as the morphological traits of the social
network. In fact, social support is an emergent characteristic
of social relations, where it is generated and it develops, and
from whence it arises. But social support is not the same as
social relations. Social support is the result of interaction (a
certain kind of interaction) carried out in a subject’s relational
context. Just as wine is not the same as the bottle, social
support is not the same as the support network. I am talking
about content, not the container. 
Is it impossible, then, to offer a proposal that is more
adequate to the process of the concept in question? Obviously,
the answer is negative. But perhaps the most sensible solution
would be to systematize the characteristic traits that have
accompanied the aforementioned estrangement process of
the concept of social support and to find the remedy therein: 
1. The definition and empirical operationalization of
social support is characterized by ever increasing
psychologization, even being considered a personality
variable by some authors. 
2. Along with this process of psychologization, some
agreement seems to have been reached about the
multidimensional nature of social support (Cohen & McKay,
1984; Diaz-Veiga, 1993; Laireiter & Baumann, 1992; Vaux,
1988). This is a meta-construct, the investigation of which
has revealed the need to generate more molecular concepts
included within it. And this persistence in progressively
reducing social support to microscopic elements has clearly
led researchers to forget its eminently social nature. 
3. In this process, one can observe how some theories—
theories that are the scaffolding on which the work on social
support has been established—operate, more or less explicitly.
Specifically, I refer to a certain manner of conceiving social
relations, which proceeds from the exchange theory. It is
impossible to perform an exhaustive analysis of this theory
and its diverse forms in these pages. Suffice to observe that
the conception of social relations that the exchange theory
deals with is extremely individualist (see Thoits, 1983, 1995).
Based on behaviorist principles, the exchange theory states
that individuals rationalize their social interaction in terms
of costs and rewards. In their emphasis on rescuing the
individual for Sociology, authors like Homans (1968)
attempted to explain social relations in terms of psychological
principles. These would be the foundation of social
interaction. Hence, a scenario is offered where several actors
participate isolatedly in the interaction, lending priority to
the dyadic analysis. Therefore, the essence of social relations
is not comprised of sociological principles, emerging within
the contract that develops in the midst of groups, but instead
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social relations are explained as being solely the sum of
interactions of each individual with other individuals,
isolatedly, and in psychological terms. In other words, the
notion of community in the analysis of social processes is
substituted by that of rational, planned, and individual-directed
cooperation. Thus, social behavior consists of an exchange
of activity, either tangible or intangible, more or less
gratifying or ungratifying, between at least two persons: the
essence of social support as it has been defined typically in
the above-mentioned bibliography (see, as an example,
Chipuer, 2001).
These are the distinctive traits of a process that seems
to have led us to a dead end, so perhaps the reversal
(obviously avoiding a reductionism of the opposite sign) of
this tendency would allow research to proceed in a different
direction. Hence, rather than segmenting social support into
increasingly more basic (supposedly) elements, it seems
pertinent to coordinate a general discussion to tackle the
definition of social support from a global perspective, and
thereby recover its eminently relational nature. To a great
extent, this recovery could depend on the use of theories
that deal with social aspects from a decidedly sociological
viewpoint. The question is the following: What would the
result of our discussion be if, instead of using theories in
which social relations are defined exclusively as relations
between atomized individuals, we used as our model or
assumption the theories in which social relations are dealt
with from a truly sociological perspective? In the following
pages, I will attempt to answer this question through the
analysis of the concept of social integration. 
Social Support as the Correlate of Social Integration:
The Collective Dimension in the Study of Mental Illness
At first glance, it seems difficult to perform an accurate
analysis of social support without referring to the concept
of social integration. However, the pyramid that holds the
conceptual labyrinth where social support was lost may be
the result of not using certain privileged material to cast
light on the nature and effects of social support: the material
provided by Sociology. We run the risk of becoming
Egyptologists searching for a terminological sarcophagus
—where social support would rest, mummified, immune to
the passage of time—to find the clues that would help us
to understand how it all started. I propose that the concept
of social integration is one of those materials out of which
a coherent explanation of social support could be built
without resorting to artifices and terminological spirals, or
to the aforementioned increasing atomization, or to locking
the nature of the concept into a psychological labyrinth from
which it is impossible to escape. 
Many sociologists have been concerned with the analysis
of the concept of social integration. However, given the
terms in which the debate is set out, it seems prudent to
resort to the works of one of the classic authors within the
discipline. In this sense, perhaps the proposals of Emile
Durkheim2 are more promising for the aims of this article.
Throughout his analyses of suicide (Durkheim, 1897/1976),
the religious phenomenon (Durkheim, 1912/1982), or
changes in the structure of societies (Durkheim, 1893/1982),
this classic Frenchman turns social cohesion into the
protagonist of his theoretical outlines, through the concept
of social solidarity. Solidarity would be comprised of the
ties among individuals and between individuals and their
community. I refer, basically, to symbolic ties. In other
words: Within human societies, cohesion is inextricably
linked to the presence of values, traditions, and institutions
that lend meaning to behavior, provide content to interaction
in daily life and to the way that each society is capable of
maintaining its structure, generating solid strategies  to
administer the basic evaluative consensus that is the nucleus
of social integration.
Thus, the analysis of social cohesion carried out by
Durkheim reveals two components: the moral one and the
normative one. The former refers to the integrative dimension
itself. Thus, the moral component refers more to the cultural
contents that organize social group life and provide the prime
material of which members of a society weave their basic
agreements (and their disagreements). The normative
component would be responsible for the specific forms of
social organization. Solidarity would be the result of both
processes. This terminological plurality may lead to confusion
in the analysis I propose to carry out, so that hereafter, I
shall consider that the moral and normative components are
the basic dimensions of social integration (which, as can be
seen, implies cultural elements to a great extent): Thus, the
social context could be described in terms of the contents of
the interaction and norms that preside over it. At this point,
I want to emphasize that the use of Emile Durkheim’s ideas
is a starting point, an example of the possibilities that a
certain manner of understanding and conceptualizing social
integration offers for the analysis of social support. It is not
meant as a finished definition. It is not an alternative
definition of social integration. The goal is to extract the
fundamental traits from the proposed approach so as to
respond to the problem expounded in the previous section.
In other words, the formal definition is not what matters, but
instead the perspective from which it is formulated (for a
detailed analysis, see Sánchez Moreno, 2002b). 
2 The analysis of Durkheim’s work is not the objective of this study. The reader may, among others, consult the works of Lukes
(1984) and Rodríguez Ibáñez (1989).
What would be the potentialities of my proposal for the
study of social support? First, the possibility of conceptual
clarification. As mentioned, there are two basic approaches
in the study of social support; structural and functional. The
structural perspective focuses on the characteristics of the
individual’s support network: number of members of the
relational network, contact frequency and network density,
duration and intensity of contacts, homogeneity of network
members… And precisely these characteristics have been
offered as indicators of social integration. If an individual
has more relations of certain frequency and duration, etc.,
then he is more integrated. If the network shrinks, the
contacts are less frequent and extremely heterogeneous, the
individual is less integrated. Now then, the analysis of
Durkheim’s proposals shows that these traits are clearly
insufficient to account for integration,3 in a dual sense. 
First, if we start out from a Durkheimian viewpoint (or
better still, a sociological one), it is virtually impossible to
accept that integration is a process extending from the
individual facet to the social facet. The agreement
(sometimes explicit), present in the bibliography on social
support and consisting of identifying the “structural”
characteristics of the support network with social integration,
is a clear confusion of levels of analysis. The description
of integration refers to the sum of the characteristics of the
individual’s network taken one by one. In this sense, the
recipe derived from this conception is clear: If an individual
is not integrated, it is because this person has few friends,
family networks are narrow, and work relations are
insufficient. Metaphorically, in this approach, social
integration is notably similar to a telephone agenda in a
person’s wallet. The more telephone numbers on the list,
the more integrated the individual will be. In other words,
the process is unidirectional, and extends, patently, from the
individual facet to the social facet. The consequence is clear:
Despite the fact that the term “social integration” is used,
we are actually referring to “something” that is more like
“individual integration.”
To attain a rigorous understanding of social integration,
it is necessary to emphasize its true sociological dimension.
Social integration is not a sum of members, contacts,
relations, etc., because one of the central elements of this
concept is comprised, precisely, of the ties that link
individuals, making social relations possible. In this sense,
I would refer instead to the term “cohesion,” what Durkheim
would call moral (to a great extent cultural) aspects of
society. And, therefore, social integration transcends the
individual level of analysis. It is a supraindividual reality,
an emergent element of community life. At this point, the
confusion in the aforementioned level of analysis is revealed:
If we use a psychological-individual level of analysis to
account for a process that is at least to some extent social,
we renounce understanding and incorporating into our
analysis of mental health our starting point, that is, concern
with the social dimension. 
In addition, fruit of this confusion in the levels of
analysis, the second insufficiency appears, imputable to
research on the relations between social support and mental
health. This insufficiency is condensed in our incapacity to
respond adequately to the following question: What are the
components of social integration? The predominant viewpoint
in the study of social support reveals that the defining traits
of social integration are the network characteristics (size,
density, etc.). However, if we accept this argument, these
characteristics do not complete the definition of the concept.
In fact, they may leave out some fundamental elements that
would allow us to make sense of the integration processes:
norms, values, shared beliefs, collective representations…The
importance of this omission is much more serious than would
seem because, while brandishing a concept (social
integration) with clear sociological connotations, we forget
one of the key elements required to understand the concept
itself, societies, and the very constitution of Sociology. In
the above pages, I referred to the concept of culture.4 To
talk about integration without mentioning its cultural
dimension is almost impossible, with the aggravating
circumstance that the solution to this problem is as simple
as resorting to one of the founding fathers of sociology. In
our case, we look to Durkheim to understand integration as
a process that starts out with the community and takes shape
in individual behaviors, and not vice versa (see, for example,
Martínez, García, & Maya, 2001). Integration goes beyond
belonging to one or another network, and refers to the
sociocultural context that presides over individual life and
lends meaning to individual and group life, provides content
for existence, and is way of access to an intelligible world. 
This analysis reveals even more potentialities. For
example, it offers the possibility of working fruitfully from
a global concept, thus avoiding subdivisions ad infinitum
in our analysis of social relations. As mentioned, one of the
reactions to the debates generated by the difficulties
encountered in research on social support has been to defend
the multifaceted nature of social support. Thus, the response
has led to an increasingly pronounced dissection of the
concept. For example, Laireiter and Baumann (1992) indicate
a series of dimensions that, according to them, define social
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3 Still more, we would find a whimsical use of the concept of social integration. See, for example, Seeman, Lusignolo, Albert, and
Berkman (2001).
4 Perhaps the true problem is the difficulty of translating into measuring instruments of all these dimensions of culture. Social norms,
shared beliefs, collective values…resist their operationalization into questionnaire items. However, this difficulty does not justify the
amputation that the concept of social integration has suffered.
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6. Received or activated support.
Along with the aforementioned obvious confusion of
levels of analysis, this segmentation into (again, supposedly)
basic elements has, to a great extent, contributed to the
psychologization of the social dimension of mental illness.
In contrast, the viewpoint defended in this article indicates
that a more appropriate way to solve the theoretical and
empirical problems in the area is precisely the opposite. It
is not necessary to make more and more divisions to
decrease the confusion. Specifically, my analysis shows that
an adequate definition of the concept of social integration,
taken in all its complexity, paradoxically simplifies (insofar
as it throws light on) the study of social support. Actually,
there are three essential concepts in this task: social
integration, social support itself, and social relations. The
first refers to the social context in which group life takes
place. Obviously, this group life is embodied in social
relations, in significant interactions wherein social support
is developed. This would be merely the functional result of
interaction within social groups. Therefore, social support
maintains a basically psychosociological nature, thanks not
so much to psychologization, but instead to its insertion into
a framework of supraindividual, sociological analysis. In
this way, social support could be defined as the functional
contents (informational, emotional, and instrumental support)
that develop in the midst of social relations.5
Last but not least, this modification of the viewpoint of
social integration facilitates a new outlook on social relations,
which can no longer be considered in behavioral terms, or
as exclusively dyadic relations. As mentioned, this
conception, derived from overconfidence in the exchange
theory, is a constant in the various conceptual (and empirical)
approaches to social support. The problem is that social
relations have been conceived apart from the culturally given
social environment, referring more to individual relations,
a notion that leads to a description of a restricted social
environment (and, consequently, no longer social). Higher
sensitivity towards sociological proposals reminds one that
group life—association—is a process that extends beyond
the sum of individual behaviors, whether or not they are
characterized by exchange. I refer to the emergent properties
of social relations, those processes that develop not as a
consequence of individualized exchange, but as a result of
social interaction understood in a broad sense, as a reality
in which individuals do act, but in a much broader cultural,
associative, and interactive setting (in conceptual and
empirical terms). As Durkheim said: the social entity creates
realities. So, if social support is a product of social relations,
and these are understood in a restricted sense as individual
exchanges (i.e., exchanges between pairs of individuals)
governed by psychological principles, then social support
will also be understood in a restricted, limited, insufficient
sense; because social support is precisely an emergent
property of social relations. To refuse to understand this
point implies locking up social support in a conception that
prevents explaining the processes that make intelligible sense
of its nature and effects. This prevents one from considering
the meaning of the adjective “social” in all its implications. 
The preceding pages are an attempt to show the
inconsistencies that have led to the diagnosed situation in
the analysis of the intellectual construction of a concept
(social support) that is, a priori, essential to understand the
onset of mental illness. Specifically, I attempted to show
the implications that a higher level of sensitivity towards a
sociological viewpoint would have (and, in fact, it do have)
in our consideration of social support, by means of the
introduction of a particular concept of social integration.
Fruit of the elaboration of the implications of this conceptual
scheme, the notable benefits observed in the debate on the
effects of social support have been revealed. These benefits
are specified in three large areas: redirecting the polemic
between structural and functional viewpoints of social
support, preventing excessive atomization of the concept of
social support, and reconceptualizing social relations based
on their strictly sociological nature. Altogether, the aim is
to redirect psychologization towards a complete
understanding of the social entity as a central factor to
explain the onset of psychological deterioration. 
References
Antonucci, T.C. (1985). Personal characteristics, social networks
and social behavior. In R.H. Binstock & E. Shanas (Eds.),
Handbook of aging and the social sciences (pp. 94-128). NY:
Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Antonucci, T.C., & Akiyama, H. (1987). Social networks in adult
life and a preliminary examination of the convoy model.
Journal of Gerontology, 42, 519-527.
Antonucci, T.C., & Jackson, J.S. (1990). The role of reciprocity
in social support. In B.R. Sarason, I.G. Sarason, & G.R. Pierce
(Eds.), Social support: An interactional view (pp. 173-198)
NY: Wiley. 
5 Whether social support is received or perceived, objective or subjective, etc., is a debate that must be solved in the operationalization
process.
Barrón, A. (1996). Apoyo social. Aspectos teóricos y aplicaciones.
Madrid: Siglo XXI.
Barrón, A., & Sánchez Moreno, E. (2001). Estructura social, apoyo
social y salud mental. Psicothema, 13, 17-23.
Barrón, A., & Sánchez Moreno, E. (2003). Alienación, apoyo social
y depresión. Encuentros en Psicología Social,1, 225-229.
Baumeister, R.F., & Leary, M.R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire
for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human
motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 3, 497-529.
Bowlby, J. (1986). Vínculos afectivos: formación, desarrollo y
pérdida. Madrid: Morata.
Cassel, J. (1976). The contribution of the social environment to host
resistance. American Journal of Epidemiology, 104, 107-123.
Chipuer, H.M. (2001). Dyadic attachments and community
connectedness: Links with youths’ loneliness experiences.
Journal of Community Psychology, 29, 429-446.
Cobb, S. (1976). Social support as a moderator of life stress.
Psychosomatic Medicine, 38, 300-314.
Cohen, S. (1988). Psychosocial models of the role of social support
in the etiology of physical disease. Health Psychology, 7, 269-
297.
Cohen, S., & McKay, G. (1984). Social support, stress, and the
buffering hypothesis: A theoretical analysis. In A. Baum, S.E.
Taylor, & J.E. Singer (Eds.), Handbook of psychology and
health. Vol. IV. Social psychological aspects of health (253–267).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cohen, S., & Syme, S.L. (1985). Issues in the study and application
of social support. In S. Cohen & S.L. Syme (Eds.), Social
support and health (pp. 3-22). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Dean, A., & Ensel, W.M. (1982). Modelling social support, life
events, competence, and depression in the context of age and
sex. Journal of Community Psychology, 10, 392-408.
Dean, A., Kolody, B., & Wood, P. (1990). Effects of social support
from various sources on depression in elderly persons. Journal
of Health and Social Behavior, 31, 148-161.
Díaz-Veiga, P. (1993). Desarrollo de la evaluación del apoyo social.
In M.F. Martínez (Ed.), Psicología Comunitaria (pp. 173-186).
Madrid: Eudema.
Durkheim, E. (1982). La división del trabajo social (C.G. Posada,
Trans.). Madrid: Akal. (Original work published 1893).
Durkheim, E. (1976). El suicidio (L. Díaz Sánchez, Trans.). Madrid:
Akal. (Original work published 1897).
Durkheim, E. (1982). Las formas elementales de la vida religiosa.
El sistema totémico en Australia (R. Ramos Torre, Trans.).
Madrid: Akal. (Original work published 1912).
Farrell, M.C., Barnes, G.M., & Banerjee, S. (1995). Family cohesion
as a buffer against the effects of problem-drinking fathers on
psychological distress, deviant behavior, and heavy drinking in
adolescents. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 36, 377-385.
Haines, V.A., & Hubert, J.S. (1992). Network range and health.
Journal of health and Social Behavior, 33, 254-266.
Homans, G.C. (1968). El grupo humano. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
House, J.S., & Kahn, L. (1985). Measures and concepts of social
support. In S. Cohen & S.L. Syme (Eds.), Social support and
health (pp. 83-108). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
Lakey, B., & Heller, K. (1988). Social support from a friend,
perceived support, and social problem solving. American
Journal of Community Psychology, 16, 811-824.
Laireiter, A., & Baumann, U. (1992). Network structures and
support functions: Theoretical and empirical analyses. In H.O.
Veiel & U. Baumann (Eds.), The meaning and measurement
of social support (pp. 33-55). NY: Hemisphere Publishing
Corporation. 
Lin, N., Dean, A., & Ensel, W.M. (1986). Social support, life events
and depression. NY: Academic Press.
Lin, N., & Ensel, W.M. (1984). Depression-mobility and its social
etiology: The role of life events and social support. Journal of
Health and Social Behavior, 25, 176-188.
Lin, N., & Ensel, W.M. (1989). Life stress and health: Stressors
and resources. American Sociological Review, 54, 382-399.
Lin, N., Woelfel, M.W., & Light, S.C. (1985). The buffering effect
of social support subsequent to an important life event. Journal
of Health and Social Behavior, 26, 247-267.
Lukes, S. (1984). Emile Durkheim. Su vida y su obra. Madrid:
CIS/Siglo XXI.
Martínez, M.F., García, M., & Maya, I. (2001). Una tipología
analítica de las redes de apoyo social en inmigrantes africanos
en Andalucía. Reis, 95, 99-125.
Pierce, G.R., Sarason, B.R., Sarason, I.G., Joseph, H.J., &
Henderson, C.A. (1996). Conceptualizing and assessing social
support in the context of the family. In G.R. Pierce, B.R.
Sarason, & I.G. Sarason (Eds.), Handbook of social support
and the family (pp. 3-23). NY: Plenum Press.
Rodríguez Ibáñez, J.E. (1989). La perspectiva sociológica: historia,
teoría y método. Madrid: Tecnos.
Sánchez Moreno, E. (1998). Apoyo social, integración social, y
salud mental. Revista de Psicología Social, 13, 537-544.
Sánchez Moreno, E. (2002a). Sociología y enfermedad mental.
Reflexiones en torno a un desencuentro. Revista Internacional
de Sociología, 31, 35-58.
Sánchez Moreno, E. (2002b). Individuo, sociedad y depresión.
Málaga, Spain: Aljibe. 
Sánchez Moreno, E. (2004). Por una sociología de la enfermedad
mental. Etiología. Cuadernos de Trabajo Social, 16, 49-71.
Sánchez Moreno, E., Álvaro, J.L., & Garrido, A. (2000). Estrés y
salud mental: El papel de la posición social y las estrategias
de afrontamiento. In J. Fernández del Valle, J. Herrero, & A.
Bravo (Eds.), Intervención psicosocial y comunitaria (pp. 397-
403). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. 
Sánchez Moreno, E., & Barrón, A. (2003). Social psychology of
mental health: The social structure and personality perspective.
The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 6, 3-11.
Sánchez Moreno, E., Garrido, A., & Álvaro, J.L. (2003). Un modelo
psicosociológico para el estudio de la salud mental. Revista de
Psicología Social, 18, 17-33.
Sarason, I.G. (1988). Social support, personality, and health. In
M.P. Janisse (Ed.), Individual differences, stress, and health
psychology (pp. 109-128). NY: Springer-Verlag.
Sarason, B.R., Pierce, G.R., & Sarason, I.G. (1990). Social support:
The sense of acceptance and the role of relationships. In B.R.
COLLECTIVIZE SOCIAL SUPPORT? 133
SÁNCHEZ MORENO134
Sarason, I.G. Sarason, & G.R. Pierce (Eds.), Social support:
An interactional view (pp. 97-128). NY: Wiley. 
Sarason, I.G., & Sarason, B.R. (1985). Social support. Insights
from assessment and experimentation. In I.G. Sarason & B.R.
Sarason (Eds.), Social Support: Theory, Research and
Applications (pp. 39-50). Dordrecht, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Sarason, I.G., Sarason, B.R., & Pierce, G.R. (1992). Three contexts
of social support. In H.O. Veiel & U. Baumann (Eds.), The
meaning and measurement of social support (pp. 143-154).
NY: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation.
Sarason, I.G., Sarason, B.R., & Shearin, E.N. (1986). Social support
as an individual difference variable: Its stability, origins, and
relational aspects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
50, 845-855.
Seeman, T.E., Lusignolo, T.M., Albert, M., & Berkman, L.
(2001). Social relationships, social support, and patterns of
cognitive aging in healthy, high-functioning older adults:
McArthur studies of successful aging. Health Psychology,
20, 243-255.
Stoller, E.P., & Pugliesi, K.L. (1991). Size and effectiveness of
informal helping networks: A panel study of older people in
the community. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 32,
180-191.
Thoits, P. (1983). Multiple identities and psychological well-being:
A reformulation and test of the social isolation hypothesis.
American Sociological Review, 48, 174-187.
Thoits, P. (1995). Stress, coping, and social support processes:
Where are we? What are next? [Extra issue] Journal of Health
and Social Behaviour, 53-79.
Vaux, A. (1988). Social support: Theory, research and intervention.
NY: Praeger.
Wills, T.A. (1985). Supportive functions of interpersonal
relationships. In S. Cohen & S.L. Syme (Eds.), Social support
and health (pp. 61-82). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Received June 14, 2004
Revision received July 27, 2004
Accepted August 30, 2004
